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Culture and the Safety of Complex Automated
Sociotechnical Systems
Allan Hodgson, Carys E. Siemieniuch, and Ella-Mae Hubbard
Abstract—Sociotechnical systems are becoming more complex
and increasingly automated. Although human error is now widely
viewed as playing a key role in the majority of system failures,
there is an increasing recognition of the oversimplification inher-
ent in such a view. This paper examines mismatches between the
procedures and automation technologies of sociotechnical systems
and their operators from the viewpoint of human culture and capa-
bilities, with a particular focus on flight deck automation. Following
an introduction to culture, its sources, its measurement, and its ef-
fects, this paper describes recent theories of thinking and decision
making, and the influence of culture on decisions. Problems that
are associated with automation are presented and it is concluded
that current automation systems perform as very inadequate team
members, leaving the human operators or crew unprepared when
failure occurs or unusual events arise.
Index Terms—Automation confusion, national culture, safety,
sociotechnical systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
A S SOCIOTECHNICAL systems (e.g., power stations, re-fineries, airliners) become increasingly complex and auto-
mated, focus has increased on the human contribution to failure.
The view of many is that the solution to problems that arise from
human error is to increase automation. However, this viewpoint
is indicative of a misunderstanding of the capabilities, strengths,
and resilience of humans, as well as a further misunderstand-
ing of the strengths and weaknesses of current and near-future
automation systems.
Section II provides an introduction to culture, its effects on
behavior and its measurement; Section III describes the ef-
fects of culture on safety-related behavior, and presents evi-
dence from the literature. Section IV introduces some current
views on thinking and decision making, the effects of culture on
these and the implications for decision making under pressure.
Section V presents several automation-related issues and their
implications, Section VI suggests future approaches to complex
sociotechnical system design, and Section VII summarizes the
paper’s main points and draws conclusions.
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II. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO CULTURE
A. What is Culture?
The term “culture” relates to the values, assumptions, prefer-
ences, beliefs, rituals, knowledge, skills, and behaviors that are
shared at the level of the social group (or society). Culture, in
particular ethnic culture (see later), is typically acquired uncon-
sciously and as a result, most people are not aware of their own
culture until they experience some form of “culture clash,” and
begin to realize that their assumptions, their views of the world,
are not shared by everyone.
B. Why do Human Groups Develop Culture?
The values, assumptions, etc., of a social group’s culture
evolve over multiple generations, and typically improve that
group’s fit with the environment. The acquisition of this “cul-
ture” provides individuals within that group with that “improved
fit,” without requiring them to expend the time or take the risks
that are associated with learning from direct experience.
Significant cultural changes can occur between generations,
enabling adaptation at a much faster rate than can occur via
genetic changes, which typically require millennia. As humans
have changed their environments at an increasing pace, the abil-
ity to change their cultural “firmware” has become increasingly
important. However, in periods of very rapid change, e.g., due
to globalization, urbanization, or migration, a group’s culture
can become a source of disadvantage because it cannot adjust
quickly enough. This may lead to group impoverishment, frag-
mentation, and conflict.
C. Forms of Culture
There are many forms of (and aspects to) culture, but the
authors will concentrate in this section on those forms of most
relevance to the issues covered in this paper.
1) Ethnic (or National) Culture: Ethnic culture is acquired
from birth via immersion in the social environment, and is the
most important form of culture due to its power and persistence.
It has been identified as a key factor in many sociotechnical
system accidents due to its effects on crew or operator com-
munication and behavior. National culture is often used as an
approximation to ethnic culture because the majority of pub-
lished data are collected at the national level; this can introduce
inaccuracies in countries where multiple distinct ethnic cultures
coexist. In the remainder of this paper, the term national culture,
rather than ethnic culture, will be used.
2) Occupational Culture: Occupational (or professional)
culture emerges out of the occupation or profession that a person
undertakes. Aspects of occupational culture that are important
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(e.g., for sociotechnical system safety) may require periodic
reinforcement via training and realistic exercises in order incul-
cate responses at a subconscious level (see Section IV-B). As
discussed later in this paper, if desirable aspects of occupational
culture are at variance with an individual’s national culture, then
major problems may arise despite regular training.
3) Organizational Culture: In businesses (private and pub-
lic), organizational cultures reflect the business leaders, mar-
kets, customers, products, etc. Organizational cultures can be
changed, but successful change requires prolonged effort and
“organizational pain.”
Employees typically adopt surface-level aspects of their orga-
nization’s culture, e.g., dress and behavior, but are very unlikely
to change the values that were acquired as part of their national
culture. As discussed in Section III-A.3, even when the safety
and success of a company is at stake, managers may not be able
to overcome their own national cultural traits in order to change
the organizational culture.
A beneficial “hybrid culture” can arise in a stable team where,
for the purposes of (and within the boundaries of) the team,
members adopt a common culture that is based on a shared
understanding of each other and the team purpose. However,
detailed discussions of this, and related issues such as team
fragmentation, are beyond the remit of this paper.
4) Safety Culture: Culture, in particular organizational cul-
ture, has been identified as a key factor in the causation of many
major accidents, for example, the Chernobyl nuclear reactor [1],
Challenger [2], Columbia [3] shuttles, Herald of Free Enterprise
passenger ferry [4], and Nimrod aircraft [5]. Therefore, an ef-
fective safety culture is of key importance to high reliability
sociotechnical organizations.
Safety culture is influenced primarily by the leadership pro-
vided by an organization’s management; it is, therefore, heavily
influenced by organizational culture and the national cultures of
the managers. Guldenmund [6], following a detailed review of
safety-related literature, defined safety culture as “those aspects
of organizational culture which will impact on attitudes and be-
havior related to increasing or decreasing risk.” As a facet of
organizational culture, safety culture requires that the latter to
be addressed in order to elicit long-term safety improvements.
A key factor in the performance aspects of safety culture re-
lates to the effectiveness of training, in particular the degree
to which it transfers to the working environment. As discussed
later, training effectiveness is also affected by national culture.
D. Measurement of Culture
In order to assess the effects of culture on performance, we
need a means of measuring the cultures of the people who work
in the organization or system. Such measures cannot capture
detailed cultural knowledge and assumptions, but can capture
certain culture-related traits. Many frameworks have been de-
veloped to capture the traits of cultural groups at the national
level, for example, those of Gallagher [7], Schwartz [8], Trian-
dis [9], Hofstede [10], Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars [11],
and House et al. [12].
TABLE I
HOFSTEDE’S CULTURAL DIMENSIONS
The selection of a national cultural framework for the authors’
research work was based on four factors— that the framework
provided quantitative scales of reasonable precision, that it pro-
vided national cultural trait values for a wide range of countries,
that it had been extensively evaluated, and that it had also been
widely applied in published studies. On the aforementioned
basis, Hofstede’s cultural framework was chosen by the au-
thors; see Table I for brief descriptions of the framework’s four
original dimensions. These dimensions have since been supple-
mented by two further dimensions—short-/long-term orienta-
tion (STO/LTO) and indulgence versus restraint [13]; because
values for most countries were not available until recently, the
authors of this paper have not, as yet, utilized these two addi-
tional dimensions.
Neither Hofstede’s framework, nor any other, represents a
comprehensive model of human culture; these frameworks are
typically based on statistically derived correlations, rather than
proven causal relationships, and individuals within cultures may
vary widely. Nevertheless, cultural frameworks enable us to
capture persistent trait values that have predictive value with
regard to group or team behaviors.
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E. Further Culture-Related Issues—Face Maintenance
The maintenance of face, both internally (self-image) and ex-
ternally (public image), is important in all cultures. However, in
collectivist [low individualism (IDV)] cultures, the maintenance
of public face is vital as it affects the status of the individual and
his/her social group. In a study of over 1000 Chinese respon-
dents carried out by the China Daily Youth [14], 75% identified
making a mistake in public as by far the most humiliating ex-
perience they could have. Pedersen [15, p. 149] commented
that face can become more important than life itself in Asian
communities, as one’s identity is based on the community’s
evaluation. As a result, the threat of loss of face (to oneself or to
an important other) can delay communications at critical times
and potentially cause major accidents.
F. Summary
This section has presented four forms of culture. Of particular
concern to the safety of sociotechnical systems is the pervasive-
ness of national culture that, in times of stress, may dominate
communications, decisions and behavior.
This section has also introduced a framework for the quanti-
tative measurement of national culture traits; such quantization
enables meaningful relationships between culture and perfor-
mance to be identified, as described in the next section.
III. INTERACTION OF CULTURE AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE
In this section, the authors utilize the cultural dimensions of
Hofstede’s framework as a basis for examining the literature on
culture-mitigated team performance. Because of space limita-
tions, the authors have concentrated primarily on the aerospace
domain, but would recommend readers also to examine relevant
papers in the nuclear and other safety-critical industries, for
example, those by authors such as Reiman, Lee and Harrison,
Pidgeon, and Cox.
Strauch [16] identified two ways in which culture can affect
the safety performance of teams—intrateam communication,
and situation awareness and decision making. The authors dis-
cuss these and other factors below before presenting evidence
of the effects of culture on safety performance.
A. Effects of Culture on Team Performance
1) Intrateam Communication: In high power distance (high
PDI) societies, the senior person in a team or group is expected
to possess all the knowledge relevant to his or her position,
even though this is unlikely in situations where significant
specialization occurs. Decisions are made autocratically and
implemented quickly (due to lack of consultation) and levels of
subordinate-initiated communication are low [17]. In low PDI
societies, authority for most decisions is typically delegated
to those with the relevant knowledge, and communication
typically flows freely up and down the formal hierarchy. Most
societies score somewhere between the two extremes.
Helmreich and Merritt’s 23 country survey of commercial
airline staff revealed that low PDI crews were willing to express
their views to their captains, whereas high PDI crews found this
difficult, even when there was a safety issue [18].
In high IDV societies, team members typically communicate
in a direct, low context manner, where the intended meaning is
in the message. In low IDV (high collectivism) societies, team
members typically communicate in an indirect, high context
manner, where only a small part of the meaning is in the message
itself, the remainder is inferred from contextual references and
preexisting knowledge [19]. If a low IDV subordinate detects
an error on the part of his or her superior, he or she must enable
the superior to make the discovery; this maintains harmony and
avoids loss of face (see Sections II-E and IV-C). However, such
an error-discovery process can take a considerable period of
time, and can involve the attention of several members of the
team (e.g., aircrew) at a critical time.
Cultural diversity amongst team members typically reduces
intrateam communication further, and increases the potential for
members to misunderstand each other.
To summarize the aforementioned, the combination of high
PDI and low IDV typically results in a much-reduced rate of
intrateam communication.
2) Situation Awareness and Decision Making: Joy and Kolb
[20] investigated the effects of cultural dimension scores on
preferred learning styles. They reported that both students and
teachers in high uncertainty avoidance (UAI) societies preferred
abstract conceptualization and reflective observation, whereas
those in low UAI societies were comfortable with concrete expe-
rience and active experimentation, e.g., training exercises with
realistic role play. Support for these results can be seen in re-
search by Burke et al. [21].
When running complex sociotechnical systems, personnel
from high UAI societies tend to follow standard operating pro-
cedures (SOPs) more closely than do personnel from low UAI
societies, thus reducing the likelihood of errors; however, they
tend to continue following these SOPs when they are no longer
relevant to the situation. Vincent and Dubinsky [22] examined
the responses of students from USA (low-to-medium UAI) and
France (high UAI) when faced with threat situations. They re-
ported that the French students exhibited more maladaptive cop-
ing than did the USA students. Klein et al. [23] stated that toler-
ance for uncertainty influences the threshold for initial reaction
to an anomaly; this is because detection of change takes place
when the observer mentally reframes his/her understanding of
a situation (see Section IV-A). Low UAI (high tolerance for
uncertainty) personnel change to a new initial understanding
(i.e., reframe) with less information than do high UAI person-
nel; however, this lower information threshold may lead to more
false alarms.
To summarize the aforementioned, high UAI encourages op-
erators to follow SOPs, which is beneficial to sociotechnical
system safety; however, high UAI can hamper decision making
in response to rare emergencies due to delayed reactions (unwill-
ingness to reframe) and reduced situation awareness resulting
from lack of realistic training.
3) Sociotechnical System Safety Culture and Safety: In this
section, we look beyond Strauch’s team performance factors
and consider the overall organization.
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Reason [24] made it clear that an effective safety culture is
dependent on the willing and active participation of the work-
force. Participation is less likely in high PDI societies because
workers are unwilling to challenge or question their superiors;
in addition, low IDV workers will not raise safety issues unless
supported by their whole group. However, surveys by Mearns
and Yule [25] of six national groupings of workers in the oil and
gas industry indicated that the greatest predictor of workforce
attitudes to safety and risk taking was workers’ perceptions of
management attitudes to safety.
It is, again, worth examining the air transport industry, as
this has led the way in many aspects of safety improvement,
and millions of hours of data have been gathered. Air transport
accidents are relatively rare and most accidents happen due to
a conjunction of factors, some of which may have been present
for a significant period of time.
The U.S. Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) [26]
started operating in 1976. It takes inputs relating to deviations,
errors, incidents, and accidents from all air transport staff, in-
cluding aircrew, air traffic controllers and mechanics, and is
relevant to both general aviation and commercial carriers. The
ASRS affords a high degree of anonymity and, because of this,
receives more than three thousand reports per month that form
the basis of detailed analyses and recommendations. The pro-
gram has been successful in reducing accidents and incidents,
and in improving education and training. Following the suc-
cess of the ASRS, the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP)
was created specifically to address U.S. commercial air carrier
safety [27]. Similar safety programs have been developed else-
where, e.g., CHIRP [28] and BASIS [29]. Where they have been
effectively implemented, these programs have made significant
contributions to the reduction of serious aircraft accidents (in
terms of losses per million flights), and to the improvement of
training and SOPs.
The success of any voluntary safety reporting program de-
pends on punishment of operators or crew being regarded as a
last resort. The Taiwanese Aviation Safety Council (established
in 1998) implemented the TACARE flight crew voluntary inci-
dent reporting system, which was based on CHIRP. However, a
survey that was carried out by Lee and Weitzel in 2003 [30] re-
vealed that participation in TACARE was low, and only limited
data were generated from it due to the Chinese authoritarian,
punishment culture.
To summarize the aforementioned: In authoritarian (typically
above average PDI, low IDV) cultures [31], it is difficult to cre-
ate the climate of trust that is a prerequisite to the collection of
data on human performance deviations and nonfatal incidents
in complex sociotechnical systems. As a result, safety improve-
ments based on modifications to processes, systems, training
and SOPs are more difficult to achieve. This is due primarily
to the company organizational environment, rather than to the
operator (or cockpit crew) team environment.
B. Evidence of the Relationships Between Culture and
Sociotechnical System Safety Performance
1) Commercial Airlines: Jing et al. [31] reported in 2001
on a statistical analysis of aircraft crash data versus cultural
traits. They identified the primary cultural variable (positively
linked to crash rate) as authoritarianism (above average PDI,
low IDV). For example, a high authoritarianism crew member
will chose adherence to the captain’s wishes over adherence
to standard procedures; also, if the captain is uncertain as to
how to do something, he cannot ask a crew member because
that would expose his lack of knowledge. Jing et al. described a
China Airlines crash that occurred due to an erroneous triggering
of the takeoff/go-around lever; neither the first officer nor the
captain would admit that they did not know how to disengage
the lever, and the captain continued attempting to land the plane
instead of aborting the landing. Jing et al. pointed out that the
whole system of civil aviation (including commercial aircraft
and SOPs) has been designed by westerners, and concluded that
the effects of extreme authoritarianism are not understood by
western designers.
During the period between 1989 and 1999, China Airlines
of Taiwan suffered six plane crashes (from a fleet of modern
Boeing, Airbus, and McDonnell Douglas aircraft) [32] and a hull
loss rate of 11.74 per million departures—more than 30 times
that of American Airlines during a similar period [33]. As stated
earlier, the TACARE flight crew voluntary incident reporting
system was not a success due to cultural reasons and, between
1999 and 2003, Taiwan’s commercial transport aircraft industry
suffered 21 accidents and 300 fatalities—an extremely high
figure for a total fleet of approximately 200 commercial aircraft.
During the period from 1989 to 1999, Korean Air suffered
nine plane crashes (from a fleet of modern Boeing, Airbus, and
McDonnell Douglas aircraft) [34] and a hull loss rate of 4.79
per million departures—more than 12 times that of American
Airlines during the same period. In 2000, David Greenberg,
formerly of Delta Airlines, was appointed to take over flight
operations. He carried out a detailed evaluation of Korean Air’s
flight crews and identified the Korean cultural trait of (extreme)
deference to authority as a key threat to flight safety; this is
the problem identified by Jing et al. in mainland China and
Taiwan [31]. The transcript of the cockpit voice recording that
was retrieved from the Korean Air crash at Guam in 1997 [35,
Appendix B] provides an example of such deference; even as the
captain made several serious errors of judgment, the first officer
and flight engineer could only hint to him as they were becom-
ing increasingly aware that a crash was imminent. D. Green-
berg subsequently made it a condition of service in Korean Air
that all flight crews communicated in English (which does not
have the many hierarchical levels of address present in Korean);
this, combined with additional training, the replacement of ex-
military crew with civilian-trained crew and the introduction of
a promotion policy based on merit, ensured that flight crews
were able to communicate much more freely with each other.
There were no further crashes between 2000 and 2010.
The aforementioned Chinese and Korean cases relate primar-
ily to Strauch’s intrateam communication issue.
Note that details of individual China Airlines and Korean Air
plane crashes can be obtained via hyperlinks embedded in [34]
and [35].
2) Military Aircraft: Soeters and Boer carried out a study
of NATO aircraft losses in 14 countries between 1988 and
1995 [36]. This showed strong correlations between accident
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rates and culture dimension scores—high PDI, low IDV, high
UAI countries suffered the highest crash rates. No significant
correlation was found with masculinity (MAS). NATO air forces
have much in common, including similar or identical aircraft,
similar regulations and operating procedures, common training
facilities, and regular personnel exchanges; therefore differences
in national culture scores appear to contribute significantly to
the variations in accident rates.
3) Taking Account of Per-Capita Gross National Product:
Culture is only one of several potential reasons for differences in
accident rates between countries; failing to examine alternative
hypotheses can lead to misleading results. Such a situation arose
with two research studies that demonstrated significant corre-
lations between aircraft accident rates and national PDI scores
[37], [38]; Hofstede reanalyzed the data with the addition of
per-capita gross national product (GNP) [10, p. 115] and found
per-capita GNP to be the dominant variable, rather than PDI.
Helmreich and Merritt [18, pp. 104–105] similarly draw readers’
attention to the potential effects on accident rates of non-cultural
factors, including facility quality and government regulation.
The authors have evaluated airline accident statistics over the
period 1970–2009, based primarily on data that are obtained
from AirSafe.com [39]. This covers similar data to that which
Hofstede reanalyzed (see above), but also includes an additional
17 years. Per-capita GNP was found to be the largest single
factor in airline accident rates, as Hofstede had found. PDI
showed high negative correlation with per-capita GNP, whereas
IDV showed high positive correlation; both PDI and IDV were
removed from the authors’ analysis, as they contributed little
extra to the explanation of accident rates. The resultant statistical
model accounted for 45% of crash variability; per-capita GNP
was negatively correlated with crash rate, whereas UAI was
positively correlated.
Note that the authors’ analysis utilized cultural scores asso-
ciated with the airlines’ countries of origin; these are not neces-
sarily the scores associated with the flight crews because many
non-western airlines employ western flight crews. Therefore,
these results provide insights primarily about the effects of per-
capita GNP and UAI scores on maintenance regimes, training,
safety cultures, and airport facility qualities. The UAI score is
of particular interest to the authors due to its implications for
safety, but it has to be treated with caution.
Although Hofstede showed that PDI and IDV have significant
correlations with low per-capita GNP, it is clear from the earlier-
described Taiwanese and Korean airlines that the combination
of above-average PDI plus low IDV in the aircraft cockpit is
an important direct contributor to accident rates; both Taiwan
and South Korea have high per-capita GNPs of US$37 720
and US$31 714 (respectively), compared with US$36 090 for
the United Kingdom [40]; all figures are based on purchasing
power parity. User PDI and IDV scores (or authoritarianism
scores) should, therefore, be taken into account when designing
complex sociotechnical systems.
C. Cultural Effects—Summary and Further Comments
Different cultures impose differing constraints on communi-
cation, situation awareness, decision-making and behaviors of
Fig. 1. Summary of the key relationships between cultural dimension scores
and sociotechnical team performance under stress.
operators of complex sociotechnical systems. High PDI, low
IDV, and high UAI scores all tend to adversely affect safety cul-
ture and lead to increased risks of accidents, in particular when
combined. Fig. 1 summarizes the main associations between
culture scores and sociotechnical system team performance un-
der stress (e.g., due to an emergency).
The solid arrows indicate positive relationships (increasing
value leads to increasing value) and the dashed arrows indicate
negative or inverse relationships.
The designs of most complex systems (e.g., nuclear power
stations, refineries, airliners, nuclear submarines) are based on
the concepts and cultures of low PDI, high IDV, low UAI Anglo
and North European countries. As a result, the operational envi-
ronments (e.g., aircraft cockpits, refinery control rooms), SOPs
and training programs associated with these sociotechnical sys-
tems incorporate inbuilt cultural assumptions (e.g., the rapid
flow of factual information between all team members); these
clash with the national cultures of many operators, resulting in
increased accident rates in those cultures.
IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL/ANTHROPOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
This section presents a brief overview of current theories of
universal human cognition that provide insights into culture’s
effects on perception, communication, and decision making.
A. Categorization and Schemas
From a very early stage of development, humans uncon-
sciously develop categories of concepts. Many researchers, e.g.,
Lakoff [41], believe that categorization is the basis of all thought
processes, i.e., until we have categorized an object or concept,
we cannot perceive it properly. Humans build high-level men-
tal schemas (frames, scripts) populated with categories and/or
subschemas and their relationships in order to represent the
world based on beliefs and prior experiences [42]; schemas are
also templates for behavior [43]. As individuals interact with
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familiar environments, they effortlessly project, combine and
populate these schemas in order to perceive and react to objects
and events around them; when excessive dissonance arises be-
tween schemas and reality, alternative schemas are substituted
(‘reframing’ occurs). Education, training, and experience result
in occupations whose members, for example, doctors, profes-
sional pilots and engineers, develop very detailed, specialized
schemas.
Although cognitively efficient, schemas provide expectations
that may bias information collection and may also result in false
recall of past events [44].
B. Dual-Process Theories
Although there remains much controversy in the details, there
is considerable evidence to support dual-process theories of
human thinking and decision making [45].
“Type-1” thinking is largely unconscious, almost effortless,
automatic, heuristic, schema-based, parallel, fast, capable of
integrating large amounts of data, and weighting many alter-
native potential outcomes, but is relatively inflexible. Type-1
processing depends on the earlier-described schemas in order
to develop procedural automaticity when carrying out complex
tasks or decisions. “Type-2” thinking is analytic, conscious, ef-
fortful, deliberative, flexible, serial, slow, directly influenced by
culture, limited by working memory and can utilize only small
amounts of data; note that type-2 thinking may ‘call in’ some
type-1 processes. Evidence from the research of cultural psy-
chologists identifies significant differences in type-2 thinking
between low IDV Eastern Asians (holistic, contextually sensi-
tive) and high-IDV North Americans and Europeans (analytic,
contextually desensitized) [46]. These culturally learned differ-
ences also influence automatic type-1 thinking processes, for
example, those processes associated with scanning scenes and
interpreting nonverbal signals. Frequent repetition leads type-2
processes to become type-1 processes (e.g., as in car driving).
In the case of sociotechnical system crews or operators, regu-
lar, realistic team-based emergency response training exercises
enable the development of appropriate, detailed schemas that
are available to type-1 processes. When an emergency occurs,
such appropriately trained operators or crew will react in type-
1 mode, retrieving the relevant mental schemas, perhaps with
minor adaptations, and applying the rehearsed procedures asso-
ciated with these. While doing this, they will also have type-2
processing capacity available, enabling them to start to build up a
mental picture of the causes of the emergency and to consciously
plan further actions to take when they have stabilized the system.
Inadequately trained operators will not have appropriate men-
tal schemas, will typically suffer cognitive overload, and will be
more likely to panic or to become passive and resign themselves
to the consequences. As stated in Section III-A2, crew/operator
training effectiveness is affected by cultural traits, in particular,
UAI.
C. Emotions
Emotions play a major part in perception and decision mak-
ing, providing a basis for evaluating outcomes of potential de-
Fig. 2. Individual decision making under pressure.
cisions. Emotions drive us to avoid negative affect (“bad feel-
ing”) situations and to seek or maintain positive affect (“good
feeling”) situations. This drive occurs at the level of automatic
responses and, via emotion schemas (which involve higher or-
der cognition) [47], also occurs at the level of complex decision
making; both of these levels are affected by culture. Chronically
accessible emotion-related schemas that are based on cultural
norms [48], for example, those relating to face in Eastern cul-
tures, can cause individuals to delay communicating essential
information, with potentially disastrous results; this is proba-
bly a major contributory cause to the Korean air crash example
described in Section III-B1. Fig. 2 presents a simplified flow
diagram of perception and decision making at the individual
level.
D. Summary re Psychological Aspects
In highly stressful, time-critical situations, effective percep-
tion, and appropriate initial responses rely on heuristic, schema-
based type-1 mental processes; the relevant schemas for these
situations can only be developed via regular realistic emergency-
response training and/or simulation exercises; this training is
less likely in high UAI societies. In addition, culturally modu-
lated chronic emotion schemas may result in delayed commu-
nications during time-critical situations.
V. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH INCREASING AUTOMATION
Sociotechnical systems are becoming increasingly auto-
mated. However, where the consequences of failure are severe
and the modes of failure cannot all be predicted, automation
systems must be backed up by humans.
Automation brings changes to the activities, workloads, situa-
tion awareness, and skill levels of human operators or crew. Be-
cause of space limitations, these changes are considered below
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with particular reference to the aviation environment. However,
automation is similarly affecting other complex sociotechnical
systems including nuclear power stations, oil and gas refineries
and platforms, ships, and the other system-of-system elements
that are essential to ensure operational effectiveness and safety
(e.g., air traffic control).
A. Transformation from Operator to Monitor
Current automation systems, e.g., flight deck automation,
place a requirement on crews to perform a passive, “outside
the loop” monitoring role, rather than an active, “doing” role.
Problems that are associated with passive monitoring have been
recognized since World War 2 (e.g., in the performance of radar
operators); laboratory tests carried out more than 60 years ago
confirmed that a major drop in vigilance typically occurred af-
ter approximately half an hour [49]. Since then, many further
studies have confirmed this monitoring problem, in particular,
where a system is highly reliable [50]. As loss of vigilance re-
flects a universal human limitation, accidents that have resulted
from passive monitoring failures should not be regarded as due
to human operator errors; rather, they are due to automation
system design errors.
B. Workload
Automation typically reduces crew mental workload during
low-load periods, but increases it during high-load periods [51].
This workload problem is exacerbated when problems arise that
impose further mental workload during these high workload
times, e.g., diversions or delays during an aircraft landing phase.
At such times, the crew workload is typically higher than for
a non-automated system, allowing any incipient failures of the
automation system, or errors in its programming, to develop into
a critical situation.
C. Situation Awareness
As out-of-the-loop monitors of automation, flight crews typ-
ically have reduced situation awareness of the current “flying
state” of the aircraft, as well as of the detailed mode of the
automation system, its constraints and its likely future behav-
ior [52]. There are many examples of this automation-linked
loss of situation awareness leading to accidents, for example,
the crash of Air France flight AF447 [53].
D. Automation Complexity and Pilot Confusion
Increasing concerns were expressed during the 1990s because
of the large number of incidents and accidents that resulted from
pilot confusion with flight automation systems [54], in partic-
ular mode confusion [55]. In 1996, the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) produced a report on the interfaces be-
tween flight crews and flight deck automation systems [56].
This report stated that there were significant vulnerabilities in
the flight crew/automation interfaces across all transport cate-
gory aircraft, and that these vulnerabilities adversely affected
the crews’ situation awareness and management of automation.
The FAA report also stated that the problems occurred at the
system level, i.e., they could not be dismissed as isolated ma-
chine or human errors; examples given in the report included
incidents and crashes due to the automation system changing
flight modes without informing the pilots. Since the 1996 FAA
report, the level and complexity of flight automation have in-
creased, and clear evidence has emerged of increasing flight
crew difficulties with automation. An updated FAA report is
soon to be released; reports based on the draft version confirm
that, in general, pilots are neither adequately trained for mod-
ern “glass cockpit” automation nor for competent manual flying
when flight automation systems hand over control [57].
E. Operator/Crew Manual Skills and Training
Gillen [58] examined the basic instrument flying skills of
a sample of U.S airline pilots; the average grades assigned
were significantly below the minimum requirements for US
Air Transport Pilot certification. Wood [59] reported on anec-
dotal evidence that was related to the loss of manual flying skills
experienced by pilots of highly automated aircraft. Fanjoy and
Young [60] reported that training and airline policies on au-
tomation could lead to pilot complacency and the deterioration
of flying skills due to lack of opportunities to practice. Following
a study of the performance of pilots during refresher training
courses, Young et al. [61] reported that the flight crews who
utilized the most flight deck automation also exhibited poorer
manual flying skills than others.
Commercial pilots undertake regular proficiency checks on
their flying skills, but have few opportunities to practice these
skills. Ebbatson [62] reported on recent U.K. incidents and non-
fatal accidents that typically occurred shortly before the pilot
flying was due to undertake an operational proficiency check
in a flight simulator. These incidents and accidents typically
involved highly experienced crews who knowingly switched to
manual control under good flying conditions. Such skill-related
accidents and incidents have major implications for crew per-
formance in abnormal situations where the automation system
disengages without prior warning.
Manually operated sociotechnical systems require operators
to possess high levels of process knowledge and system ex-
perience in order to operate them effectively. As the level of
automation has increased, the levels of experience and skill
necessary to recover successfully from a failure or unexpected
situation that automation cannot handle have increased, rather
than decreased. This is because there is typically a much lesser
period of time during which the operator can become aware of,
and react to, a developing process problem; the operator has
to cope with automation-related problems as well as process-
related problems.
In the cases of the ditching of a US Airways Airbus A320
on the River Hudson in 2009 [63] and the uncontained engine
failure of a Qantas Airbus A380 over Batam Island, Indonesia in
2010 [64], it was only the exceptional experience, manual flying
skills, and judgments of pilots and crews that enabled successful
outcomes. In the case of the crash of an Air France A330 in the
Atlantic in 2009 [53], the pilot flying had much less experience,
in particular of manual stall recovery. As the “baby boomer”
HODGSON et al.: CULTURE AND THE SAFETY OF COMPLEX AUTOMATED SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS 615
TABLE II
EXAMPLES OF INCIDENTS DUE TO AUTOMATION FAILURE
pilots who have extensive manual flying experience retire, they
are being replaced by pilots who have little prospect of gaining
such experience.
F. Automation–Induced Incidents and Accidents
Changes in workload, reductions in situation awareness,
mode confusion, reduced operator skills, automation failures
and unexpected behaviors have caused many incidents and ac-
cidents over the past three decades; see Table II for recent exam-
ples [65]–[67]. With the increasing complexity of modern flight
decks, such events are likely to increase.
The situation following handover from automation to man-
ual control due to extreme conditions or failure is particularly
problematical; in many cases, the automation system (e.g., flight
management system, FMS) will have maintained stability until
it is no longer possible to do so, resulting in the aircraft go-
ing out of control as the flight crew take over. If damage has
occurred or instrumentation has failed, FMS advice is often mis-
leading or incorrect, and flight crews are typically overloaded
with excess information and alarms. For example, the crew of
the earlier-described Qantas Airbus A380 was faced with more
than 50 simultaneous FMS alarms, including recommendations
to pump fuel into badly holed wing tanks.
Current aircraft automation systems are largely unintelligent.
For example, fuel movements, trimming of flying surfaces and
changes to engine thrust take place with little if any assessment
of the larger picture beyond the immediate trigger. In partic-
ular, logical evaluations of situations (why am I doing this?)
and predictions of the likely results (what will happen if this
continues?) are not generally carried out.
G. Automation as an Inadequate Crew Member
For over two decades, researchers have expressed concerns
about the direction that automation, in particular aircraft au-
tomation, is heading. They have highlighted the paucity and
low quality of interaction between crews and automation sys-
tems [68], and the need for multisensory feedback to crews [69].
It is now increasingly recognized that the automation element of
a sociotechnical system typically acts as a poorly trained, incom-
municative member of the system’s crew—largely defeating the
purpose of crew resource management training. In order for a
crew to achieve the level of shared situation awareness required
for safe operation, the automated system must become, to an
adequate degree, part of the crew.
If an operator or crew member of a sociotechnical system has
to make a number of unusual adjustments, he or she will typi-
cally remark on this to others, thus maintaining shared situation
awareness; current automated systems may indicate adjustments
(or states) on one of many dials or screens, but they do not typi-
cally draw attention to them—in part because they lack situation
awareness of the “bigger picture,” i.e., of the potential ramifica-
tions. Many incidents and crashes have occurred due to this lack
of communication, e.g., the China Airlines Boeing 747 loss of
control near San Francisco, CA, USA [70], the China Airlines
Airbus A300 crash at Nagoya, Japan [71] and the Boeing 757
crash at Cali, Colombia [72]. In each of these cases, clear com-
munication from the automation system and, where appropriate,
desisting from counteracting the human pilots’ actions, would
have prevented the subsequent incidents.
H. Automation and National Culture
Sherman et al. [73] surveyed the attitudes of 5879 airline pi-
lots from 12 nations toward flight deck automation. They listed
15 automation-related statements (e.g., “I am concerned about
losing skills,” “More automation is better,” “I prefer automa-
tion”), and for each country and for each statement, calculated
the percentage of pilots who agreed [73, Table IV]. Sherman
et al. reported that the influence of national culture on the
pilots’ agreement (or otherwise) was far greater than that of
organizational culture or pilot experience. The authors of this
paper carried out a further statistical analysis of Sherman et al.’s
survey results against default national cultural scores, which
provided additional insights. For example, the “more automa-
tion is better” scores were positively correlated with national
PDI scores, and the “I prefer automation” scores were posi-
tively correlated primarily with national PDI and UAI scores.
The strongest correlation appeared to be between national cul-
tural scores and “Should always use auto”; support for this
statement was strongly negatively correlated with masculinity
(MAS), and positively correlated with PDI. Of the remaining
statements, five were positively or negatively correlated with
UAI and seven were not significantly correlated with national
cultural scores. It appears, from the aforementioned survey re-
sults, that high PDI pilots and high UAI pilots are generally
more positive about automation than are their lower PDI and
lower UAI colleagues. The aforementioned results should be
treated with caution as they are based on only 12 countries four
of which are Anglo.
I. Summary of Automation Safety Issues
To-date, increased automation, in particular aircraft automa-
tion, has resulted in changes to primary crew functions (from
adept “doers” to inadequate “monitors”), increases in crew
workloads when unexpected events or emergencies occur, re-
ductions in crew situation awareness and downgrading of crew
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Fig. 3. Relationships between current automation systems, training policies,
and team performance in emergencies.
“hands-on” skills. As a result, when the automation system fails,
manual recovery is compromised. Developments in automation,
combined with airline crew flight training policies, are resulting
in an increasing gap between actual and required crew capability
and situation awareness. In terms of Reason’s “Safety Space”
model [74], flight automation systems are moving rapidly in
the direction of increasing vulnerability, as are other complex
sociotechnical systems, for example, nuclear power stations and
refineries.
Fig. 3 summarizes the relationships between current automa-
tion policies and performance.
VI. FUTURE REQUIREMENTS OF COMPLEX
SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS
It is important that future developments in sociotechnical
system automation take into account the encultured human op-
erator; some of the implications of this are discussed in the
following sections.
A. Culturally Sensitive Designs
Designers of complex systems must include user (operator
or crew) properties in their specifications, if they are to deliver
reliable, safe systems. To-date, far from designing culturally
sensitive, or even culturally neutral systems, designers have
assumed that their systems will be operated by culturally similar
users.
It would be prohibitively costly to produce complex so-
ciotechnical systems that are highly optimized for individual
cultures; in addition, in many cases (e.g., commercial aircraft),
a particular organization may employ operators or crews from
several cultures. However, research has been applied to the de-
sign of interfaces to accommodate a wide range of cultures, and
TABLE III
MATCHING INTERFACES TO CULTURE (BASED ON MARCUS’ GUIDELINES,
SUMMARIZED TO INCLUDE MATERIAL OF RELEVANCE TO THIS PAPER)
this shows promise. Ford and Kotze [75] carried out statisti-
cal tests of the accuracy, speed, and satisfaction of users from
various cultural backgrounds when utilizing ten test interfaces
based on Marcus’ design guidelines [76].
Ford and Kotze found that interface designs for high PDI, high
MAS, high UAI, and STO users were equally effective for low
PDI, low MAS, low UAI, and LTO users; the aforementioned
options are gray highlighted in Table III. Whereas such designs
do not tackle directly the problems that are associated with team
member communication (e.g., in high PDI, low IDV crews), they
could contribute to increased shared situation awareness.
The authors have developed tools that assess the degree of fit
between operator culture and sociotechnical system [77]. These
can provide guidance as to the aspects of the operator tasks that
are at odds with their cultures.
B. Automation as a Crew Member
Studies have demonstrated that crew performance under time
pressure improves with more naturalistic automation-crew in-
teractions. For example, Thomas [78] evaluated pilots’ abilities
to deal with non-normal flight deck events when automation as-
sisted to various levels with checklists and used voice messages
to communicate to them. Pilot workload ratings were reduced
when they interacted with the automation similarly to how they
interacted with their copilots; pilots also preferred this level of
automation, partly because it provided insights into automation
activities.
Klein et al. [79] proposed ten challenges that automation
must tackle in order to become a team player, including mod-
eling crew members, collaborating and managing attention. It
is clear from such challenges that a significantly higher level
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EXAMPLES OF AUTOMATION INTELLIGENCE
of intelligence than is currently practicable will be required to
fully meet the goal of “automation as a team player.” How-
ever, as an interim step, the automation-crew member, when
acting as “pilot-flying,” should be expected to keep the human
crew informed of its activities and modes, to actively warn the
crew before mode changes and to highlight any discrepancies or
unusual occurrences. The automation system should also have
sufficient intelligence to detect or predict problems and inform
the human crew in advance of “throwing in the towel”; see
Table IV for examples.
Verbally communicating problems such as those in Table IV
to the crew would ensure shared situation awareness prior to
the need to take corrective action, and would also change the
crew members’ operating mode from passive monitoring. Such
an interaction capability demands a higher order of computer
“awareness” of flying-related activities and automation activ-
ities, more than is the case with current automation systems.
However, a separate intelligent system that has “read access
only” interfaces to FMS status, plans, and flight data could be
developed and improved, without requiring complete redevel-
opment and recertification of the current automation technology.
Culture further complicates the development of the
“automation-as-a-crew-member” concept. Crews of different
nationalities have differing automation-related preferences (see
Section V-H), and may require differing interactions with auto-
mated crew members; for example, high PDI crews may prefer
authoritative (command orientated) automated crew members,
whereas low PDI crews may prefer them to adopt a more advi-
sory role. A long-term goal would be to incorporate cognitive
models of encultured human crews into the automation system
in order to enable effective interaction.
C. Crew Training
Manually operated sociotechnical systems require high lev-
els of operator process knowledge and system experience for
safe and effective operation. As the level of automation has in-
creased, the experience and knowledge necessary for a success-
ful recovery from a failure or unexpected situation has increased,
rather than decreased. The new multicrew pilot’s license (MPL)
training framework offers practical training improvements, as it
specifies in detail realistic simulator-based training [80]; it also
aligns with requirements for simulator-based refresher courses
and “recovery from failure” exercises that inculcate the men-
tal schemas for prompt corrective actions when faced with so-
ciotechnical system failures.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents evidence of the effects of cultural traits
(as expressed in terms of Hofstede’s framework) on intrateam
communication, situational awareness, and decision making,
and the consequent effects on sociotechnical system accident
rates. The authors examined problems that are associated with
current approaches to airliner automation, where there is of-
ten a dichotomy between system designer cultures and sys-
tem user cultures, leading to errors, misunderstanding, and
in the worst cases, system failures. This dichotomy is shown
to be compounded by current design trends that ignore uni-
versal human limitations associated with the passive moni-
toring of reliable systems. This leads to reductions in opera-
tor/crew skills and reduced shared situation awareness, resulting
in severely compromised abilities to recover from automation
failures.
Pilots with high manual flying experience are now retiring,
giving extra urgency to improved training (e.g., based on the
MPL framework). Although some piecemeal developments can
usefully be made to improve the intelligence of automated sys-
tems and move toward automation as a crew member, a long-
term solution would be to incorporate cognitive models of en-
cultured crew members in the automation system; this would
require in-depth cross-disciplinary research. The aim is to make
the automated system a cooperative, culturally sensitive, effec-
tive member of the sociotechnical system crew.
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